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Early Marriage, Age of Menarche, and Female
Schooling Attainment in Bangladesh
Erica Field and Attila Ambrus
Harvard University
Using data from rural Bangladesh, we explore the hypothesis that
women attain less schooling as a result of social and ﬁnancial pressure
to marry young. We isolate the causal effect of marriage timing using
age of menarche as an instrumental variable. Our results indicate that
each additional year that marriage is delayed is associated with 0.22
additional year of schooling and 5.6 percent higher literacy. Delayed
marriage is also associated with an increase in use of preventive health
services. In the context of competitive marriage markets, we use the
above results to obtain estimates of the change in equilibrium female
education that would arise from introducing age of consent laws.
I. Introduction
In much of the developing world, adolescent and child marriage con-
tinues to be a strong social norm, particularly for girls. Early female
marriage is associated with a number of poor social and physical out-
comes for young women and their offspring. On average, girls who
marry as adolescents attain lower schooling, have lower social status in
their husbands’ families, report less reproductive control, and suffer
higher rates of maternal mortality and domestic violence.
1 In addition,
these individual outcomes suggest a number of larger social conse-
quences of early marriage, including higher population growth, more
rapid spread of disease, and a higher incidence of orphans.
As a result of these patterns, governments in developing countries
face increasing pressure to eradicate the practice with legal sanctions
1 Jensen and Thornton (2003) provide a recent overview of these patterns worldwide.882 journal of political economy
against parents who marry daughters before a standard age of consent.
Proponents of age of consent laws argue that forcing parents to delay
marriage will increase female schooling attainment and reproductive
control and decrease the incidence of domestic violence, and social
programs increasingly contain program rules designed to discourage
the practice. For instance, a prominent micro-ﬁnance program in India
excludes parents who marry daughters before 17, and national educa-
tion vouchers in Bangladesh exclude married girls. However, while sta-
tistics indicate that women who marry young fare worse, it is difﬁcult
to assess the extent to which these outcomes are driven by the timing
of marriage as opposed to common factors related to poverty and tra-
ditional gender views that also hinder female advancement. Given that
child marriage is most common in impoverished and culturally tradi-
tional settings, the observation that women who married young have
on average less education does not imply that forcing girls to postpone
wedlock would improve their outcomes.
This paper attempts to shed light on the issue by studying the school-
ing consequences of early marriage for girls in rural Bangladesh, an
area with one of the highest rates of child marriage worldwide. Since
it is also an environment of rapidly expanding schooling opportunities
and returns to education for girls, adolescent marriage is frequently
blamed for the persistent gender gap in schooling attainment. To es-
timate the inﬂuence of marriage practices on girls’ schooling, we employ
a two-step methodology. In the ﬁrst step we measure changes in school-
ing investment that result from a random subset of girls being forced
to postpone marriage. In particular, we make use of variation in the
timing of menarche as an instrumental variable (IV) for age of ﬁrst
marriage. The idea behind this identiﬁcation strategy is the following:
While there are frequently incentives to marry daughters as young as
possible, in Bangladesh as in many parts of the world, girls are typically
withheld from the marriage market until the onset of puberty. This
institutional feature in the context of high rates of very early marriage
presents a binding constraint on exposure to adolescent marriage op-
portunities. In particular, natural variation in the timing of ﬁrst men-
struation within the age range of 11–16 generates quasi-random differ-
ences in the earliest age at which girls are at risk of marrying.
2 Our
estimates indicate that each additional year that menarche is delayed
postpones marriage 0.74 year. This physical barrier to younger mar-
riages, insofar as it is independent of schooling investment, presents a
unique opportunity to assess the effects of child marriage on female
education outcomes.
2 See Palmert and Boepple (2001) for a discussion of distributions of age of menarche
across populations.female schooling attainment in bangladesh 883
The validity of the IV strategy depends on potential unobservable
differences in family background inﬂuencing both adolescent matura-
tion and adult outcomes. Survey data on parents’ wealth as well as adult
height and health indicators reveal no signiﬁcant differences in family
background according to age of menarche within the age range to which
we restrict our estimates. More important, this bias would work against
our central ﬁndings. Hence, the results may underestimate parents’
increase in schooling investment that arises from delayed marriage.
We also present evidence that reaching menarche indeed affects
schooling through marriage decisions rather than through a direct ef-
fect by comparing the inﬂuence of delayed puberty on marriage and
schooling according to sex-speciﬁc birth order. We show that, because
of a traditionally strong preference for marrying daughters in order of
birth, menarche has very little inﬂuence on marriage when a girl has
many older sisters, and the inﬂuence of menarche on marriage declines
continuously with sex-speciﬁc birth order conditional on the total num-
ber of female siblings. We then test whether the direct effect of menar-
che on schooling attainment follows a similar pattern according to sex-
speciﬁc birth order. The logic here is that, while the number of older
relative to younger sisters determines how quickly a girl can marry, it
should not be related to religious or social attitudes of the girl’s family
that could induce them to take a daughter out of school after she reaches
puberty. Hence, if the relationship between menarche and schooling is
driven by parents’ preference to remove girls from school at puberty,
the inﬂuence of menarche on schooling attainment should be inde-
pendent of birth order. Put differently, if the effect is driven by a change
in female behavior at puberty, the treatment effect of puberty on school-
ing should vary across households on the basis of some characteristics
such as religiosity, and not vary within households on the basis of in-
dividual characteristics such as birth order. Instead, the direct inﬂuence
of menarche on schooling is nearly twice as large for eldest siblings and
is sensitive to age gaps between female but not male siblings. We also
show that the effect of menarche on schooling is independent of
whether a woman follows restrictions on dress that traditionally begin
at the onset of puberty. Hence, there is no evidence that our effects are
disproportionately high among girls from more traditional or religious
households, as would be anticipated if the effect were driven by adher-
ence to social customs.
In the second stage of the analysis we show how the previous empirical
results can be used for macro-level policy analysis. The IV estimates
correspond to how a change in a woman’s individual constraint affects
her schooling attainment. In contrast, an age of consent law imposes a
universal constraint on marriage choices, which gives rise to potentially
complicated equilibrium adjustment effects with ambiguous direction884 journal of political economy
of inﬂuence. The regulation induces a change in the equilibrium
amount of monetary transfers that brides of different ages have to pay
when they marry, which in turn can change marriage age decisions of
even those women who were not directly affected by the change (who
in the absence of regulation would have married at an older age). How-
ever, we provide a simple condition on preferences under which the
equilibrium adjustment is very simple: those women who would marry
younger than the minimum legal age in the absence of regulation marry
exactly at the minimum legal age if the restriction is imposed, whereas
the marriage age decisions of all other women are unaffected. The
condition requires that women can be ordered with respect to their
incremental utilities from marrying a year later and men can be ordered
with respect to their incremental (dis)utilities from marrying a bride
who is a year older, a plausible assumption in the setting under study.
The resulting equilibrium adjustment procedure implies that our em-
pirical estimates can be used to predict the impact of age of consent
laws since the effect of a universal constraint on a woman’s marriage
age is identical to her facing the same individual constraint.
The results we obtain indicate that female schooling is substantially
constrained by marriage opportunities at young ages. A 1-year post-
ponement of marriage between the ages of 11 and 16 increases schooling
by an estimated 0.22 year and adult literacy by 5.6 percent. Correspond-
ingly, at the aggregate level we estimate that legally restricting marriages
below age 17 would increase average female schooling by a minimum
of 0.56 year, or 9 percent. The individual effect of postponement is
substantially higher below age 16 than above, but at the aggregate level,
this is partially offset by the fact that for each additional year there are
more individuals who are not biologically constrained: A universal con-
straint on marriages below 16 would increase average schooling by only
0.22 year. In addition to increasing education, later marriage is asso-
ciated with signiﬁcant improvements in utilization of prenatal care ser-
vices. Since these gains are independent of schooling attainment, they
indicate an important age effect of marrying late in addition to the
potential impact of education on health behavior.
Our approach ﬁlls an important gap in the existing literature on
marriage institutions in developing countries by generating possibly the
ﬁrst estimates of the causal effect of child marriage on female schooling
and the predicted impact of age of consent laws. While there is a small
literature that investigates the correlates of marriage age, little research
has examined the direct inﬂuence of early marriage, presumably be-
cause of the difﬁculty of ﬁnding exogenous variation in institutional
rules. The methodology we introduce to predict equilibrium responses
from reduced-form estimates can potentially be used in other settingsfemale schooling attainment in bangladesh 885
to assess the impact of imposing constraints on transactions in a com-
petitive market.
II. Motivation
The gender gap in schooling attainment remains high in many parts
of the developing world, even in settings in which the economic returns
to schooling appear to be as large for women as for men (or larger) or
the direct costs are lower (Schultz 1987). For instance, in Bangladesh,
only 56 percent of women between the ages of 25 and 30 in 1996
completed primary school (grade 5) relative to 77 percent of men in
their cohort, and more than twice as many boys as girls enrolled in
grade 10 (Khandker and Samad 1995; Bruce, Hewett, and Lloyd 2001).
Particularly striking is the fact that even in recent years when the gov-
ernment of Bangladesh has provided a universal stipend for female
secondary school that covers the bulk of the direct costs of education
for girls but not for boys, the attainment gap has persisted. Although
girls and boys are now equally likely to enroll in secondary school, girls
drop out by grade 11 (age 16) at ﬁve times the rate of boys.
3
In settings such as Bangladesh, traditional customs that sanction ad-
olescent marriage are frequently blamed for low female schooling at-
tainment because they raise the opportunity cost of educating girls. As
summarized in the Mahmud’s report, “the pressure for early marriage
remains a powerful force that shapes the alternatives girls have and
constrains their access to secondary education” (Mahmud 2003). How-
ever, while it is true that child marriage and low female schooling at-
tainment go hand in hand since girls rarely continue school once they
are married, this by itself reveals little about the degree to which parents’
choices are constrained by marriage opportunities and hence the added
schooling that girls would receive if the practice were abolished.
For a number of reasons, laws that encourage girls to postpone mar-
riage may not improve their schooling outcomes or overall well-being.
First, parents’ motives for marrying daughters at young ages are often
strongly related to economic circumstances of the family. In addition
to removing the economic burden on their parents’ household, younger
brides typically attain higher-status husbands with lower dowries. Hence,
families that choose this path may be those that are unable to provide
for their daughters or care least about their welfare. Higher education
may further increase the price a girl has to pay for a spouse if social
norms require that husbands have higher education levels than wives,
giving further disincentive for parents to invest in daughters’ schooling
3 In particular, according to a recent project evaluation, female students constituted 48
percent in grades 6–10 but only 13 percent in grades 11–12 (Mahmud 2003).886 journal of political economy
before marriage. In contrast, a girl’s education is rarely valued in tra-
ditional marriage markets and so would not directly improve her choice
set. Second, delaying marriage might not increase girls’ education be-
cause of lack of schooling opportunities, in which case forcing girls to
marry later might cause them to be sent into the labor force to provide
for their families and cover the increased cost of marriage.
In what follows we focus on the question of how age of consent laws
would affect female education, and we restrain from interpreting the
results in a formal welfare analysis. The reason is mainly that the data
available to us do not provide sufﬁcient information for such an analysis.
First of all, in most cases of adolescent marriage, the relevant decision
makers are parents or caretakers, and we cannot assess the extent to
which they internalize the interests of their children. For example, if
parents are not fully altruistic and marriage is costlier for girls who
marry later, then girls end up marrying inefﬁciently early. Even if parents
try to incorporate their daughters’ interests into marriage decisions,
they might make systematic errors, for example, underestimating the
value of education. Second, it is difﬁcult to quantify the positive exter-
nalities of an increase in female education in Bangladesh. Third, if an
age of consent law affects the level of dowries in the marriage market,
then a welfare analysis would need to take into account the induced
changes in household consumption.
III. Data and Methods
A. Setting
We examine the causal effect of adolescent marriage among a repre-
sentative sample of women in Matlab, a relatively impoverished region
of rural Bangladesh. The setting is appropriate given low levels of av-
erage schooling and marriage age. Nationwide, only about 70 percent
of children in Bangladesh enroll in primary school, of which almost
two-thirds drop out before completing the 5–6-year cycle. Bangladesh
also has one of the lowest adult literacy rates in the world, averaging
around 30 percent for adults over 40 and only 22 percent for women.
In addition, early marriages are customary for female adolescents
throughout rural Bangladesh, almost all of which are arranged by par-
ents.
4 The International Centre for Research on Women’s Demographic
Health Survey, 1996–2001, lists Bangladesh as the country with the
second-highest rate of child marriage, with an estimated 75 percent of
girls married before they reach age 18 (ICRW 2003). In response to the
problem, the government has attempted on several occasions to institute
4 In Matlab, only 1.6 percent of women under 44 report independently selecting their
spouse (1996 data from the Matlab Health and Socioeconomic Survey [MHSS]).female schooling attainment in bangladesh 887
age of consent laws, none of which have had a discernible effect on
marriage practices in rural areas.
5 While the country has witnessed a
gradual increase in the average age of female marriage of approximately
3 years over the past quarter century, a signiﬁcant fraction of girls con-
tinue to marry below the age of 16.
6
An important feature of local marriage markets is the dowry system.
Although dowries are currently illegal in Bangladesh, they are prevalent
among Muslims and Hindu families alike. In the MHSS data, roughly
two-thirds of recent brides (under age 30) report some amount of dowry
given to their husbands’ families at marriage. Dowry is typically under
control of the woman’s husband and in-laws, and it can be difﬁcult for
a woman to secure for her own use should the marriage terminate (Bates
et al. 2004).
B. Data
Data for the analysis come from the 1996 MHSS. The primary survey
consists of household- and individual-level information on 4,364 house-
holds clustered in 2,687 baris, or residential compounds, an approximate
one-third random sample of the total number of baris in the surveillance
area (Rahman et al. 1999). The primary sampling unit of the MHSS
was the bari, a cluster of extended families that functions as the basic
unit of economic activity, landholding, and social identity. In each bari
a maximum of two households were selected for interview. Within house-
holds, all individuals over 55, the head, spouse, and parents of the head,
and a random sample of other members between 15 and 49 were
interviewed.
The MHSS data are ideal for implementing our identiﬁcation strategy.
First, detailed economic and demographic data were collected at the
individual, household, and village levels. In particular, each ever-married
woman was asked to provide complete schooling, marital, and repro-
ductive histories, including the timing of menarche, age at ﬁrst mar-
riage, and outcome of all pregnancies. An important advantage of the
data is the fact that survey reports of births and marriages could be
cross-checked with vital statistics information, including marriage and
birth records from the regional Demographic Surveillance System
5 Arends-Kuenning and Amin (2004) report that the series of child marriage acts in
Bangladesh, which gradually increased the legal age of marriage from 12 to 18, had almost
no effect on the timing of marriage for rural households other than to encourage mis-
reporting on marriage documents.
6 An estimated 75 percent of rural girls in Bangladesh marry before the age of 16 (Barkat
and Majid 2003).888 journal of political economy
(DSS), minimizing concern over recall bias and misreporting.
7 All sam-
ple members were also asked about current health status, and survey
takers collected on site anthropometric measures including height and
weight. Information on family background was collected in a survey
module pertaining to sample members’ parents, and currently married
women were asked about details of their married life and health
behaviors.
C. Sample Construction
We limit our sample to the 2,101 ever-married women between the ages
of 25 and 44 who have nonmissing data for our outcomes of interest,
excluding women in the Determinants of Natural Fertility Survey sub-
sample. The left-hand cutoff point was chosen to minimize censoring
of women who marry for the ﬁrst time late in life while retaining the
largest possible share of the sample. Of the women in our sample, 95.5
percent are currently married, 3.1 percent are unmarried widows, and
1.4 percent are unmarried divorcees.
Summary statistics for the sample are presented in table 1, divided
according to age of marriage and age of menarche. The data reﬂect
the national patterns of low female marriage age, schooling, and literacy
and high fertility. The median age of ﬁrst marriage is 15, and the sample
has extremely low levels of education and literacy. Among those who
ever attended school, 41 percent cite marriage as the primary reason
for dropping out. Roughly one-third of the women in the sample report
some form of subservience to their spouse or in-laws, as indicated by
being prevented from leaving the house for work or family visits or
having money or possessions taken from them, although the majority
report participating in family decisions.
As reported in columns 2 and 3, differences in schooling outcomes
between women who marry early and those who marry late are consistent
with the global trends: the literacy rate among women who married
before age 16 is only 60 percent that of women who marry later, and
schooling attainment is 1.3 years lower. The fact that father’s and
mother’s schooling and own school enrollment at age 9 are also sig-
niﬁcantly higher for women who marry later indicates important unob-
servable differences between these subsamples confounding ordinary
least squares (OLS) estimates of the relationship between marriage age
and adult outcomes.
7 Note that approximately 25 percent of sample members born outside of the region
are absent from birth records, and marriage records are missing for at least 5 percent of
those who married prior to 1973.female schooling attainment in bangladesh 889
D. Estimation Strategy
To assess the causal effect of early marriage on female schooling, we
use age of menarche as an IV for marriage age. As demonstrated in
numerous medical studies, the transition from childhood to reproduc-
tive age in normal, healthy adolescents occurs across a wide range of
ages in any population (Scott and Johnston 1985; Cambridge Encyclopedia
of Growth and Development 1998). In Bangladesh, where age at ﬁrst mar-
riage is traditionally bounded below by menarche, these differences
generate exogenous variation in girls’ risk of marrying young (Begum
2003). Although informal prearrangements may be made when children
are young, it is relatively rare to enter a girl into an ofﬁcial union before
she has reached puberty.
8 Meanwhile, menarche generates a strong shift
in parents’ demand to marry daughters. As explained by Begum, “In
Bangladeshi society a teenage daughter reaching menstruation becomes
a burden for many parents because preservation of her virginity is the
greatest concern for a bride. As a result . . . parents like to get their
daughters married as early as possible” (2003, 86).
For the most part, the MHSS data reﬂect these patterns. Columns 4–
6 of table 1 report the mean ages at ﬁrst marriage corresponding to
each year of menarche in the sample, also illustrated in ﬁgure 1. Over
70 percent of ﬁrst marriages take place within 2 years of menarche. Less
than 18 percent of women report prepubescent marriages, and the
majority (68 percent) of these cases are those in which marriage pre-
cedes menarche by 1 year. As evident in ﬁgure 1, after age 13 the timing
of ﬁrst marriage climbs steadily with the onset of puberty. Figure 2 shows
the distributions of age of marriage and menarche, revealing a signif-
icant symmetric shift in the timing of marriage with each tercile of
menarcheal age.
The IV approach involves estimating a two-stage model of the follow-
ing form, where is the outcome of interest, is individual i’s age at YA ii
marriage, and is i’s age at menarche, the instrument used to identify Zi
the ﬁrst-stage equation:
  Y p a  a A  a X  u (1) i 01 i 2 ii
and
  A p b  b Z  b X  n. (2) i 01 i 2 ii
In all the estimates, includes the following set of controls: adult Xi
height, family background and family composition characteristics, re-
ligion, and a dummy variable indicating whether the woman currently
8 Bullough (1981, 366) reports that “in Islamic countries it was criminal to have sexual
relations with a woman before she had menstruated. Before a marriage . . . women were
to examine the girl to see that she was physically prepared.”890
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Fig. 1.—Age of menarche and age of ﬁrst marriage. Data are taken from the 1996
MHSS. The sample includes ever-married women between 25 and 45 with nonmissing
values for age at marriage and age at menarche who reached menarche between 11 and
17.
resides in a district of Matlab that is part of the treatment region for
the national fertility intervention. Family background characteristics in-
clude father’s and mother’s education, whether father owned farmland
or a family business, value of father’s property, number of siblings, num-
ber of female siblings, whether mother and father survived to age 50,
and whether the individual was enrolled in school at age 9. As detailed
in Joshi (2004), economic circumstances of the family, including
whether a girl’s father was alive at marriage, are strong predictors of
marriage market outcomes in the MHSS sample.
9 We also include 5-
year age intervals and a linear time trend for age.
10 Robust standard
errors are used in the analysis to correct for clustering at the bari level.
Identiﬁcation of the IV model requires a strong correlation between
age of menarche and age of ﬁrst marriage. As the pattern in ﬁgure 1
illustrates, this requirement is well satisﬁed in the MHSS data. Results
from the ﬁrst-stage regression with and without the full set of controls
and village ﬁxed effects are presented in table 2. For the base speciﬁ-
cation with full set of controls (col. 3), every additional year that puberty
is delayed, marriage is postponed an estimated 0.74 year, with a standard
error of 0.06 and an F-statistic of 146. Column 2 allows for nonlinearity
9 Dummy indicators of whether parents were alive at marriage produce similar results
to mortality by age 50 but are arguably less exogenous to marriage timing.
10 All estimates are also run with single year of birth ﬁxed effects and dummy indicators
of village of residence. The point estimates throughout are robust to this speciﬁcation,
although the table 6 results lose statistical signiﬁcance when both sets of ﬁxed effects are
included.female schooling attainment in bangladesh 893
Fig. 2.—A, Age of menarche and marriage. B. Age of marriage by age of menarche
group. Data are taken from the 1996 MHSS. The sample includes ever-married women
between 25 and 45 with nonmissing values for age at marriage and age at menarche who
reached menarche between 11 and 17. Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth p 1.
in the effect of menarche on marriage by including dummy indicators
of menarcheal age. Throughout the analysis, results are presented with
the speciﬁcation of column 3 but are universally robust to a nonlinear
ﬁrst-stage regression and village ﬁxed effects (col. 6).TABLE 2
First-Stage Regression: Age of First Marriage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age of menarche .743 .738 .803 .682 .789
(.063)** (.061)** (.065)** (.087)** (.088)**
Menarche 11 3.803
(1.015)**
Menarche 12 2.219
(.384)**
Menarche 13 2.534
(.245)**
Menarche 14 1.485
(.232)**
Menarche 15 .685
(.245)**
Height (cm) .010 .009 .008 .007
(.012) (.012) (.015) (.017)
Age .121 .134 .175 .058
(.044)** (.044)** (.065)** (.059)
Value father’s
property .001 .019 .004 .018
(.034) (.036) (.043) (.051)
Contraceptive
intervention .255 1.69 .141 .354
(.125)* (1.762) (.182) (.173)*
Father business .091 .061 .295 .030
(.230) (.236) (.302) (.343)
Father farmer .159 .183 .064 .326
(.162) (.169) (.252) (.211)
Father’s schooling .038 .028 .034 .007
(.021) (.021) (.027) (.036)
Mother’s schooling .130 .108 .118 .058
(.041)** (.042)* (.047)* (.092)
Hindu .936 .776 1.313 .777
(.215)** (.270)** (.361)** (.266)**
Mom alive age 50 .219 .210 .564 .064
(.217) (.216) (.315) (.300)
Dad alive age 50 .190 .231 .452 .033
(.237) (.247) (.318) (.330)
Village ﬁxed effects No No No Yes No No
Universe All All All All In school
at age 9
Out of
school at
age 9
F-statistic 140.11 34.18 145.97 152.01 61.75 81.09
Observations 2,101 2,101 2,101 2,101 1,012 1,089
Note.—Data are taken from the 1996 MHSS. OLS regression; dependent variable is age at marriage. Standard errors
are in parentheses. Robust standard errors account for sample clustering (baris). Regressions also include 5-year age
dummies. Results are robust to single-year age ﬁxed effects. Value of father’s property is given in units of 100,000 taka.
* Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.female schooling attainment in bangladesh 895
IV. Estimation Issues
A. Endogenous Instruments
In order to identify an IV model using age of menarche as an instrument
for marriage timing, the exclusion restriction requires that the rela-
tionship between puberty and adult outcomes is fully mediated by
changes in age at ﬁrst marriage, such that delayed marriage is the only
pathway through which physical maturation inﬂuences schooling. Bio-
logical research into the determinants of age of menarche reveals that
genetic factors are by far the strongest predictors of adolescent devel-
opment and that random genetic variation is a signiﬁcant component
of timing (Campbell and Udry 1995). For instance, in one landmark
study, Kaprio et al. (1995) compared the correlation in age of onset
across 1,283 pairs of monozygotic and dizygotic twins and found that
the correlation in age of onset among dizygotic twins was merely 0.21,
whereas the correlation among monozygotic twins was nearly three times
as large. These differences indicate a high degree of genetic determin-
ism and hence a minimal role of environmental inﬂuences on
maturation.
11
While these patterns indicate a high degree of variation in timing of
menarche that is unrelated to family background, there is nevertheless
room for external inﬂuences on age of onset that may be particularly
relevant in less developed countries. The following factors are known
from laboratory experiments to have the potential to inﬂuence menar-
che: geography and climate (altitude and cold weather are thought to
delay puberty; Nazian and Piacsek 1976; Lehrer 1986); strenuous phys-
ical activity or stress (ambiguous direction of inﬂuence, but in most
cases causes delay; Bronson 1987; Pellerin-Massicotte et al. 1987); ex-
posure to endocrine-disrupting chemicals, including hormone-mimick-
ing agents or other toxic substances such as lead (direction of inﬂuence
varies by compound: estrogen-mimicking compounds hasten onset
whereas testosterone-mimicking compounds delay onset);
12 sex com-
position of peer group (ambiguous direction; Vandenbergh 1969; Van-
denbergh, Whitsett, and Lombardi 1975; Mucignat-Caretta, Caretta, and
11 The same study estimated that genetic factors explained 74 percent of variance in
age at menarche, a ﬁnding that is consistent with many other estimates of heritability from
human (Gedda and Brenci 1975; Fishbein 1977; Sklad 1977; Meyer et al. 1991) and animal
studies (Nelson et al. 1990).
12 See Der et al. 1974; McLachlan and Dixon 1977; Gellert 1978; Kimmel et al. 1980;
Kramer and Meijs-Roelofs 1982; Yamada, Itoh, and Ohta 1989; Walters, Rourke, and Ero-
schenko 1993; Whitten 1993; Gellert 1995; Gray and Ostby 1995; Toppari, Larsen, and
Christiansen 1996; Cooper and Kavlock 1997; Howdeshell and vom Saal 1997; Komura et
al. 1998; Andersson and Skakkebaek 1999; Monosson et al. 1999; Clark, Kelton, and
Whitney 2000; Laws et al. 2000; Stoker et al. 2000; Whitney and Clark 2001; Withuhn,
Kramer, and Cushing 2003; and Golub et al. 2004.896 journal of political economy
Cavaggioni 1995); and abrupt changes in diet resulting in acute mal-
nutrition in utero or in childhood (delays onset).
13
The ﬁrst ﬁve factors are unlikely to confound our analysis. In the
relatively small and uniformly rural district of Matlab, there is little
variation in climate or altitude. Sex composition of peer groups is
arguably distributed across individuals independently of adult out-
comes. While exposure to environmental pollutants such as lead and
pesticides is strongly correlated with income in some settings, within
Matlab, chemical exposure is unlikely to confound the analysis when
age is controlled for. Similarly, while in many parts of the world hard
labor is strongly associated with poverty, it is unlikely to vary within
this population since very few adolescent girls engage in work outside
of the residence.
In contrast, the potential correlation between menarche and nutrition
is a concern in this sample: the rate of acute malnutrition in rural
Bangladesh was 10.7 percent in 1999 (World Health Organization
Global Database on Child Growth and Malnutrition 1999; see also Sha-
habuddin et al. 2000). The extent to which this poses a problem for
our analysis depends on whether differences in nutrition are large
enough to exert an inﬂuence on endocrine systems. Though a vast
number of nonexperimental studies suggest that age of menarche is
potentially sensitive to moderate changes in nutritional intake, results
from human studies are inconclusive because of the difﬁculty of isolating
inﬂuences on puberty in nonexperimental settings. A review of this
literature and its shortcomings is detailed in Field (2007). As a result,
laboratory experiments arguably provide the only reliable evidence on
sources of interference.
While experiments show that food restriction has the potential to
trigger delays in onset of puberty, this body of research reveals two
important caveats. First, there is ample evidence that the inﬂuence of
nutrition on hormone-releasing agents that trigger menses is experi-
enced only at extremely high levels of food restriction. Among the lab-
oratory studies investigating the correlation between food restriction
and pubertal development reviewed as part of the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency’s Endocrine Disrupter Screening Program (EDSP), only
differences in food intake that reduced weight gain by more than 50
percent during developmental stages preceded and followed by an
abrupt return to normal levels of food intake resulted in delayed onset
13 All laboratory evidence involves abrupt changes in food intake as opposed to chronic
deprivation, so it is ambiguous whether such a shock is necessary to throw the hormone
system off balance.female schooling attainment in bangladesh 897
of puberty.
14 More important, there is also signiﬁcant evidence that any
change in nutrition that has consequences for the timing of menarche
would reveal itself in growth stunting. While no studies contained in
the EDSP review in which food intake was manipulated to reduce body
weight gain by 10–34 percent had any effect on menarche, stunting
occurred at considerably lower levels of food restriction. Extensive an-
imal studies from the 1910s and 1920s (see Krogman 1972, 135–37) also
show consistently that malnutrition has a far bigger effect on growth in
size than on maturational progress. Hence, while it is difﬁcult to ex-
trapolate observed dose responses to human populations, even a con-
servative interpretation of laboratory results indicates that only mal-
nutrition severe enough to cause stunting during childhood could cause
a delay in menarche, consistent with a recent assessment of human
populations (Stathopolu, Hulse, and Canning 2003). This fact allows us
to assess the degree of endogeneity with data on the height of women
in our sample. Adult height is commonly linked to early health status
and nutrition. Since height is largely driven by prepubescent growth, it
is widely considered to capture the degree of stunting due to inadequate
nutrition and health in childhood.
15
Table 1 presents summary statistics broken down by menarche age
terciles for a number of adult outcomes available in the MHSS, including
height. If the claim is correct that undernutrition severe enough to
delay menarche will necessarily reveal itself in extreme stunting, the
data indicate no signiﬁcant association between nutrition and age of
menarche in the population of girls who reach puberty in the restricted
age range. In a regression of adult height on age of menarche, the
coefﬁcient estimate is very close to zero and insigniﬁcant, evident in
the height data in row 2 (cols. 4–6) of table 1. Figure 3 shows the kernel
density estimate of adult height by terciles of menarcheal age, revealing
that the population distributions and not just averages are remarkably
similar across all subsamples.
16 This evidence is also consistent with the
14 See Kennedy 1957; Widdowson and McCance 1960; Kennedy and Mitra 1963; Ron-
nekleiv, Ojeda, and McCann 1978; Merry and Holehan 1979; Wilen, Bastomsky, and Naf-
tolin 1981; Aguilar et al. 1984; Friedman et al. 1990; I’Anson et al. 1991; Wade and
Schneider 1992; Ahima et al. 1996, 1997; Barash et al. 1996; Chehab et al. 1997; Cheung
et al. 1997, 2001; Plant and Durant 1997; Schneider, Hall, and Wade 1997; Dougherty et
al. 1998; Vasallo et al. 1998; Howenstein et al. 2000; Messer and I’Anson 2000; Engelbregt
et al. 2002; and Mann and Plant 2002. A summary table is available at http://www.epa
.gov/scipoly/oscpendo/pubs/edmvs/foodstudyreftable.pdf.
15 A number of studies suggest that the height of a child by age 4 is a discriminating
indicator of previous nutrition and childhood disease and a reasonably accurate predictor
of adult height (Martorell and Habicht 1986; Fogel 1990, 1991; Martorell 1993; Herrinton
and Husson 2001).
16 If anything, adult height appears to be slightly skewed to the left for girls who mature
early, consistent with studies from development biology that show that reaching puberty
early is associated with a shorter stature in adulthood with no corresponding effects on
health.898 journal of political economy
Fig. 3.—Adult height. Data are taken from the 1996 MHSS. The sample includes ever-
married women between 25 and 45 with nonmissing values for age at marriage and age
at menarche who reached menarche between 11 and 17. Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth
p 0.8.
results of a recent detailed health study conducted in four rural villages
of Bangladesh, which found no statistically signiﬁcant differences in the
prevalence of major health conditions among menstruating and non-
menstruating girls below age 16 (Chowdhury et al. 2000). Other family
background characteristics reinforce the anthropometric evidence.
None of the following measures appear to differ signiﬁcantly by age of
menarche: father’s and mother’s education, family wealth, and number
of siblings (table 1).
17 Furthermore, there is no signiﬁcant association
between age of menarche and a range of indicators of adult health
status (table 1).
This set of evidence suggests that much of the variation in timing of
ﬁrst menstruation is uncorrelated with determinants of adult well-being
other than marriage age and that differences in family background
according to age of menarche are unlikely to confound the analysis.
Height can also be included as a right-hand-side variable in the regres-
sion analysis in order to control for early nutritional status. Because
adult height may not be a sufﬁcient statistic for childhood nutrition, we
17 Nor is there an apparent difference in menarcheal age, with height controlled for,
by time trends in economic conditions. Statistical tests conﬁrm the absence of a signiﬁcant
correlation between puberty and national GDP or average rainfall (gathered from the
University of Delaware Air and Temperature Precipitation Data for years 1950–96) during
childhood. Estimates are available from the authors on request.female schooling attainment in bangladesh 899
also control for other available indicators of childhood socioeconomic
status (SES), listed in Section III.C.
Perhaps most important, the potential association between age at
menarche and early childhood nutritional status is substantially less of
a concern because low SES is universally associated with lower educa-
tional attainment. Hence, omitted variables related to childhood SES
in equation (2) would presumably bias downward our IV estimates of
the causal effect of delayed marriage on education and literacy (by
biasing downward our ﬁrst-stage estimates of the effect of menarche on
marriage). In addition, because endogeneity is an issue of central con-
cern to the analytical methods, we limit the age range of menarche to
11–16 years in order to reduce the likelihood that maturation is cor-
related with family background. This range covers 90 percent of women
in the sample. Both very early and very late ﬁrst menstruation are linked
to chronic medical conditions, as well as extreme physical and emotional
stress (Palmert and Boepple 2001).
B. Selective Mortality
Another estimation issue in using retrospective information is selective
mortality. If either early marriage or early menarche is associated with
higher mortality in adulthood, the estimates could be biased. For this
reason, we restrict the sample to women under the age of 44. Data from
the region indicate that selective mortality is unlikely to present a prob-
lem within this range: According to MHSS data on respondents’ moth-
ers, 82 percent of mothers born between 1935 and 1945 are alive in
1996. Although the statistic is not perfectly analogous to the probability
of dying between 15 and 43 since mothers are on average older than
15, life expectancy should be signiﬁcantly higher for women in younger
cohorts and at younger ages.
18
18 In addition, we restrict the sample to women between the ages of 26 and 44 since
women over 43 in 1996 were unlikely to have any opportunity to attend secondary school.
Owing to extremely limited educational opportunities for girls in rural Bengal prior to
1962, less than a third of MHSS women over 43 were enrolled in school at age 9, and
only 3.64 percent attended secondary school, implying that very few women remained in
school long enough for matriculation to be affected by physical maturation. According
to MHSS data, 75 percent of schools in the region were established after 1960. In 1960,
there were only four secondary schools in Matlab, only one of which accepted girls. We
choose the cutoff age for schooling opportunities to be consistent with the cutoff age in
the regression analysis: when the ﬁrst schools built during expansion opened in 1962,
women born in 1953 would have been 9 years old, so we identify this cohort as the ﬁrst
group of women for whom secondary school was a real possibility.900 journal of political economy
C. Recall Bias
Another concern with the data is potential measurement error due to
recall bias or systematic misreporting in the variables collected retro-
spectively. As mentioned earlier, the ability to double-check birth and
marriage data with DSS records eliminates much of the concern over
measurement error in these data.
19 In contrast, it is not possible to cross-
check age of menarche with outside sources since no records are kept
of this event by government or health practitioners. Given this, one fear
is that imperfect recall may lead respondents to approximate menarche
with marriage such that the correlation is spuriously strengthened.
We do not expect measurement error to present a signiﬁcant problem
in these data for two reasons. First, recalled age of menarche has been
shown to be highly reliable in numerous studies. According to a survey
by Ellis (2004, 921), “both adolescent girls and adult women are gen-
erally willing and able to report accurately on their ages at menarche
. . . and retrospective reports may be more reliable than those obtained
during puberty” (reviewed in Graber, Brooks-Gunn, and Petersen
[1996]; see also Dorn et al. 1999).
20 Although women in Matlab are in
many ways uncharacteristic of average respondents, special care was
taken by MHSS survey takers to collect accurate reproductive histories,
including probing respondents with memory triggers and monitoring
responses with a range of consistency checks (Rahman et al. 1999).
Furthermore, since the DSS has operated for over 30 years in Matlab,
residents are relatively accustomed to calculating and reporting ages
associated with life cycle events. Hence, it is reasonable to expect re-
spondents to report menarche with equal accuracy.
Second, owing to the social importance of this event in rural society,
marked by many important and dramatic lifestyle changes, it is reason-
able to expect that women remember the timing with even greater
precision than women in developed countries. For example, as soon as
a Muslim girl in Bangladesh reaches menstruation, she is instructed to
pray ﬁve times a day, to keep fast, to wear special clothes such as long
shirts and trousers, and to cover her head and breast with a veil (Begum
2003). According to a recent qualitative study of adolescents in Matlab,
100 percent of girls associate menarche with changes in dress, and 67
percent associate menarche with increased housework (Bosch 2001,
19 Because a considerable fraction of women either were born outside of Matlab or are
too old to have complete demographic records, we conduct separate analyses of older
cohorts and in-migrants.
20 As the article elaborates, “Test-retest reliability has been established in several long-
term prospective studies in which self-reported age at menarche was ﬁrst obtained in
adolescence and then again 17 to 37 years later. Correlationsacrossthesetwomeasurement
periods have been consistently high, ranging from .67 to .79” (Livson and McNeill 1962;
Damon et al. 1969; Casey et al. 1991; Must et al. 2002).female schooling attainment in bangladesh 901
chap. 7). Additional research reports that the majority of girls are un-
aware of menstruation before it begins and as a result frequently are
terriﬁed and traumatized by the event (Nahar et al. 1999). The religious
beliefs associated with these practices in addition to observable physical
changes that occur with puberty also decrease the possibility that families
are willing and able to disguise menarche in an effort to reduce potential
stigma associated with postponing wedlock. Furthermore, there is no
anecdotal evidence that the stigma of marrying late falls as puberty rises.
If anything, families have strong economic incentive to reveal a daugh-
ter’s eligibility for marriage as soon as it is socially acceptable to do so.
Finally, there is no empirical evidence of signiﬁcant recall bias. For
instance, many types of imperfect recall would show up in changes in
the distribution of menarcheal age over time, yet the data reveal no
signiﬁcant heteroskedasticity with respect to menarche reports and re-
spondents’ age.
21 A more comprehensive diagnostic check involves com-
paring the distributions of menarche age between women with educated
and uneducated mothers, reported in ﬁgure 4. In particular, we separate
mothers according to whether they were sent to school before age 10,
which is presumably unrelated to maturation. Here, the idea is to isolate
a group of families who have a preexisting preference for later marriage
unrelated to their daughter’s maturation. Since menarche is exogenous
to this preference, a signiﬁcant difference in reported age of onset across
these types would suggest either recall bias or strategic misreporting.
Instead, as revealed in ﬁgure 4A, while the ﬁrst group has a signiﬁcantly
higher ﬁrst marriage age and the distribution of marriage age is strongly
shifted to the right, ﬁgure 4B reveals no signiﬁcant difference between
the distributions of age of onset across the subsamples.
D. Intergenerational Effects
The genetic component of age of menarche may imply that women
with later onset have the additional advantage of having mothers who
also experienced later marriage. In this sense, the beneﬁts of later mar-
riage may be transmitted through intergenerational linkages other than
biology. If late marriage leads to higher schooling attainment, families
in which this biological trait is prevalent across generations may be those
with persistently higher investment in girls.
While the data will not allow us to directly measure intergenerational
correlations between age of menarche and marriage timing, we predict
the inﬂuence of this indirect channel to be relatively minor for a number
21 Potential population changes over time in age of menarche limit the abilitytoperform
standard diagnostic checks of additive measurement error with age. For instance, it is
ambiguous whether the fact that average age of menarche rises slightly over time reﬂects
a biological phenomenon or a relationship between recall bias and age.902 journal of political economy
Fig. 4.—A, Age of marriage, schooled and unschooled mothers. B, Age of menarche,
schooled and unschooled mothers. Data are taken from the 1996 MHSS. The sample
includes ever-married women between 25 and 45 with nonmissing values for age at mar-
riage and age at menarche who reached menarche between 11 and 17. Epanechnikov
kernel, bandwidth p 1.
of reasons.
22 First, marriage timing has little potential inﬂuence on the
schooling outcomes of older cohorts of women, for whom schooling
opportunities were extremely scarce. Second, means in table 1 reveal
that observable measures of family background are balanced by menar-
22 An unfortunate disadvantage of these data is that the sample of ever-married women
contains very few sibling or mother-daughter pairs because in rural areas of the country,
married couples generally live in the husband’s parents’ household during the husband’s
father’s lifetime.female schooling attainment in bangladesh 903
che age group. Finally, regression controls for available family back-
ground characteristics minimize the potential inﬂuence of second-order
effects on the empirical estimates.
V. Results
A. Schooling and Literacy
To gauge the impact of marriage timing on schooling attainment, we
measure the impact of delayed marriage on highest grade attained and
literacy rates among women who were enrolled in school at age 9.
23 We
restrict the sample to those who were enrolled in school at age 9 in
order to focus the analysis on girls for whom the marriage constraint
is potentially binding. This amounts to isolating the treatment on the
treated as opposed to calculating the intent-to-treat effect, which pro-
vides valuable precision when close to half of the population is known
to be outside the sphere of inﬂuence. Although earliest menarche is
11, we choose 9 as the cutoff point for school attendance since signs of
menarche may appear up to 2 years before onset.
Results from the IV estimates for schooling and literacy are reported
in table 3 alongside corresponding OLS estimates. Columns 1–4 report
grade attainment and literacy for women who were enrolled at 9. The
results indicate that postponing marriage by 1 year between ages 11 and
16 increases educational attainment by an average of 0.22 year. Corre-
spondingly, an additional year of delay increases adult literacy by 5.6
percent (4.1 percentage points). These estimates suggest that universal
marriage postponement would generate substantial increases in edu-
cational attainment and literacy among those who have access to primary
school, ceteris paribus. For instance, expanding this estimate by the
number of postponed marriage years necessary to increase the average
marriage age from 15 to the legal minimum of 18 implies a 14.2 percent
increase in average female schooling and an almost identical change in
female literacy. Columns 5–8 repeat this exercise for the full sample of
women, including the roughly 50 percent who were never enrolled in
school and 6 percent who either started school after 9 or dropped out
of school before 9. Not surprisingly, the intend-to-treat estimates of
marriage age on schooling among the full sample are much weaker in
both the OLS and IV speciﬁcations. Just as we would expect, the esti-
mated magnitude is roughly half the size when all girls are included,
and the attainment results are signiﬁcant only at the 10 percent level.
Columns 9 and 10 of table 3 show results from a control experiment
23 Literacy is deﬁned broadly from respondents’ reports of reading and writing ability
on a scale of 1–3. Respondents who reported either 1 or 2 on both measures were con-
sidered literate.904
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in which marriage age instrumented with menarcheal age is regressed
on school enrollment at 8. Assuming that parents cannot predict timing
of puberty from girls’ observable characteristics at 8, the positive and
signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on marriage age in column 9 indicates the pres-
ence of unobservable determinants of both schooling and marriage age
that bias OLS estimates upward. Meanwhile, the IV estimate is close to
zero and insigniﬁcant, suggesting that the instrument is not contami-
nated by the same unobservable correlates.
B. Direct Effect of Menarche on Schooling
Menarche itself may be the barrier to schooling, in which case increasing
legal age at marriage would not have the estimated effect on education.
This violation of the IV exclusion restriction could arise if traditional
rules governing female mobility prevented girls from attending school
after ﬁrst menstruation. As opposed to the case of marriage, the MHSS
data reveal that puberty is not a universal constraint on school atten-
dance: 75 percent of girls who are enrolled in school a year before
menarche remain in school for at least 2 years, and their average length
of time in school after menarche is 2.5 years. Still, it could be the case
that all of the estimated schooling effect is attributable to a relaxation
of the puberty constraint facing up to 25 percent of girls from traditional
families.
To test whether menarche has a direct effect on schooling, we examine
variation in the magnitude of estimates across women facing different
observable constraints on marriage timing based on sex-speciﬁc birth
order, a characteristic that is exogenous to age of puberty. Because of
the traditional preference for marrying daughters according to birth
order, women with older female siblings should have less opportunity
to respond to early maturation since they face additional constraints
imposed by sibling marital status. Hence, if education is inﬂuenced by
marriage opportunities rather than by puberty itself, schooling re-
sponses to puberty should be larger on average among ﬁrst-born girls
and decline steadily with sex-speciﬁc birth order. In contrast, if the effect
of puberty delay is driven solely by traditional attitudes toward school
attendance, the effects should be independent of birth order. To test
this, we restrict the sample to women with at least one female sibling
(90 percent of the sample) and regress schooling attainment on age of
menarche and age of menarche interacted with the number of older
female siblings and sex-speciﬁc birth order.
24 Because the number of
24 Sex-speciﬁc birth order is deﬁned as the number of older female siblings divided by
the total number of female siblings.female schooling attainment in bangladesh 907
TABLE 4
Inﬂuence of Menarche on Schooling According to Sex-Speciﬁc Birth Order
and Observation of Religious Customs
Age of
Marriage
(1)
Age Quit
School
(2)
Highest
Grade
Attended
(3)
Age Quit School
(4) (5)
Age of menarche .397 .934 .241 .172 .259
(.114)** (.124)** (.108)* (.079)* (.139)***
Sex-speciﬁc birth
order 4.698 6.609 4.157
(2.411) (2.982)* (2.355)
Sex-speciﬁc birth
order # Age of
menarche .329 .387 .303
(.163)* (.201) (.160)*
Number of female
siblings .111 .036 .08
(.095) (.108) (.093)
Number of siblings .058 .015 .05
(.054) (.063) (.058)
Universe ≥ 1 female
sibling
≥ 1 female
sibling
≥ 1 female
sibling
Always wear
head scarf
in presence
of men
Do not always
wear head
scarf in
presence
of men
Observations 851 851 851 847 304
Note.—Data are taken from the 1996 MHSS. Regressions in cols. 1–3 are restricted to girls with at least one female
sibling. All regressions are restricted to the subsample of girls who are in school at age 9. To standardize for family
size, sex-speciﬁc birth order is measured as the number of older female siblings divided by the total number of female
siblings. All estimates are robust to including year of birth or 5-year cohort dummies. A woman is classiﬁed as always
wearing a head scarf in the presence of men if she answered “always” to both of the following survey questions: “Do
you cover your head inside the bari in the presence of men?” and “Do you cover your head inside the bari in the
presence of outsider men?”
* Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
female siblings may be correlated with other family characteristics, all
regressions control for total female and male siblings.
Results from both speciﬁcations are presented in table 4. The esti-
mates indicate that the schooling attainment of younger daughters is
signiﬁcantly less sensitive to age of menarche than that of older daugh-
ters. Since elder and younger daughters are evenly distributed across
traditional and nontraditional families conditional on sibship size, this
indicates within-family differences in the effect of menarche on school-
ing, which must therefore be independent of parents’ preference to
keep girls out of school when they reach puberty. A coarser way of
studying these relationships is to run the baseline regressions separately
for eldest and younger daughters. Doing so reveals that, conditional on
enrollment at 10, the age of quitting school is sensitive to menarche
only for eldest daughters. Unless traditional attitudes systematically ap-
ply only to eldest girls, this ﬁnding provides strong evidence that puberty908 journal of political economy
does not directly cause girls to quit school. It is hard to imagine that
any social norm grounded in religious beliefs would vary systematically
according to birth order.
As a second check on whether our results are driven by a direct
inﬂuence of menarche on school attendance, we divide the sample
according to religious practices associated with reaching puberty. In
particular, the vast majority of women in our sample (74 percent of the
analysis sample) report currently wearing a head scarf in the presence
of men from both inside and outside the bari, a change in dress that
is traditionally required beginning at the onset of puberty. By regressing
dropout age on age of menarche separately in these two subsamples,
we test whether the relationship between schooling and menarche is as
strong among women who do not observe such practices. Indeed, a
comparison between the estimated coefﬁcient on age of menarche in
columns 4 and 5 of table 4 reveals that schooling attainment and onset
of puberty are just as highly correlated among women who are sub-
stantially less observant of traditional gender norms. The estimated ef-
fect of menarche on schooling is virtually unchanged when the sample
is restricted to the minority of women least likely to observe restrictions
on dress and mobility associated with puberty.
Both ﬁndings are consistent with two additional pieces of evidence:
First, in a recent qualitative study of adolescents’ views about menarche
in Matlab, 86 postmenarcheal adolescent girls were asked to list all
lifestyle changes associated with menarche (Bosch 2001, chap. 7). Al-
though a wide range and number of changes were reported, school
attendance was not mentioned. In contrast, 67 percent report that they
started helping with daily chores. Second, MHSS respondents were asked
the primary reason they quit school, and none cite puberty or menarche.
C. Secondary Outcomes
1. Health Care Behavior
Both an increase in education and an increase in marriage age may
have secondary effects on female outcomes. To explore this, we analyze
MHSS data on health care practices during pregnancy, including the
rate at which a woman seeks prenatal care when she is pregnant, the
average number of prenatal visits, and whether she has ever received
an antitetanus shot while pregnant.
25 Although there is evidence from
25 Variables were constructed from averaging responses across all pregnancies from the
following survey questions asked about each of a woman’s pregnancies: (1) “During preg-
nancy . . . did you ever have a pregnancy check-up?” (2) “How many antenatal visits did
you have during . . . pregnancy?” (3) “When you were pregnant with . . . were you given
an injection in the arm to prevent the baby from getting tetanus, that is, convulsions after
birth?”female schooling attainment in bangladesh 909
past research that many health behaviors are positively inﬂuenced by
schooling, the effect of early marriage on preventive care may operate
through channels other than education. In particular, girls who begin
their reproductive cycle at younger ages may be more isolated or less
empowered and as a result less likely to seek appropriate health care
during pregnancy and childbirth. To make this conceptual distinction
clear, we refer to behavioral changes related to marriage age but not
education as “age effects.”
To empirically disentangle the effects of education from determinants
of health care practices related to marriage age, we make use of the
fact that the education effects of marriage timing are experienced only
by the subpopulation of girls who were enrolled in primary school. In
this manner, marriage age and schooling attainment can be separately
identiﬁed by comparing subsamples of women who were and were not
enrolled in school at age 9. Only if the inﬂuence of marriage age is
restricted to the former group could education gains be entirely re-
sponsible for behavior change. If the unschooled are also better off,
age effects must play a role. Table 5 presents results from the IV analysis
on both subsamples. In all estimates, age of marriage is instrumented
by age of menarche as in the previous regressions.
These estimates suggest that health care practices improve substan-
tially with later marriage. Interestingly, the estimates reveal signiﬁcant
improvements in prenatal care not only among the educated but also
among the subpopulation for whom schooling is unaffected by marriage
age, indicating that the increases in health care utilization do not op-
erate exclusively through changes in schooling. A year of marriage delay
is associated with an 8.6 percent increase in the likelihood of prenatal
care during pregnancy for women who attended school and a 9.1 per-
cent increase for woman who did not attend school. There is also an
associated increase on the intensive margin: a year of marriage delay is
associated with a 5.7 percent increase in the average number of antenatal
visits for women who attended school and an 11.6 percent increase for
woman who did not attend school, and the effect is signiﬁcant only for
the latter. There is also a strong estimated inﬂuence of marriage age
on receiving antitetanus shots during pregnancy among girls who did
(11 percent) and did not (8.5 percent) attend primary school.
The results indicate that, whereas educated women are encouraged
to take up prenatal services as a result of marrying late, uneducated
women are inﬂuenced by later marriage only in terms of switching from
one to several clinic visits. One interpretation of this pattern is that
secondary school improves women’s awareness of available health ser-
vices, thereby increasing the likelihood that they will seek out any care.
Meanwhile, marriage age alone increases the likelihood that a woman
will have the freedom to take advantage of services known to her, for910
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instance, by responding to health workers’ suggestions for more fre-
quent checkups. For instance, uneducated women who marry later may
have greater freedom to leave the home for or spend money on health
care services. Consistent with this story, results from regressions of two
indicators of personal freedom on marriage age indicate that un-
schooled women who marry later face fewer restrictions by husbands
and in-laws with respect to consumption and mobility (cols. 7 and 8 of
table 5). The dependent variable in these regressions is constructed
from the following MHSS survey questions: whether the respondent
reports that her husband or in-laws have ever prevented her from leaving
the bari for work or family visits or have taken away her money or
possessions. Separate analysis on each of the four components reveals
that the largest change comes from reducing the likelihood that women
are prevented from leaving the bari for work. Since marriage age is not
associated with a reduction in household restrictions among educated
girls, there is no evidence that it operates through schooling. More likely
the effect is related to convergence in age between spouses that accom-
panies later marriage.
2. Spousal Quality
The last stage of analysis examines trade-offs parents face in making
decisions about marriage timing by looking at data on dowry payments
at marriage and observable characteristics of spouses. The ﬁnding that
marriage opportunities curtail schooling investment suggests that the
beneﬁts to girls of delaying marriage come at a cost to their families,
presumably in terms of higher dowry payments or less desirable spouses.
Anecdotally, in rural Bangladesh, dowries increase with each additional
year that marriage is postponed because of the high demand for youthful
brides.
26 Meanwhile, past ﬁndings from India conﬁrm a strong positive
association between dowry payments and suitability of the husband,
measured in terms of his relative superiority in education and family
SES (Halli 2003).
To explore how parents respond to these trade-offs, we estimate the
dowry cost of later marriages using the same IV strategy from the pre-
vious section. We similarly explore how characteristics of spouses in
terms of education level, age, and family wealth are related to marriage
timing. If parents indeed spend more on daughters who marry later,
26 Cited reasons for this preference include the beliefs that younger brides are (a) more
fertile, (b) more likely to lack sexual experience, and (c) easier for husbands and in-laws
to control. Foster and Kahn (2000) argue that the increase in female age at marriage and
corresponding reduction in average age differences between spouses as an equilibrating
mechanism for demographic changes in the supply of spouses reﬂects a decrease in the
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TABLE 6
Marriage Market Outcomes
Value of
Dowry
(1)
Spouse
Highest
Grade
Passed
a
(2)
Spouse’s
Father’s
Education
b
(3)
Spouse
Wealthier at
Marriage
(4)
Spouse
Age
(5)
Age of marriage 343.234 .047 .045 .006 .719
(191.318) (.158) (.111) (.021) (.452)
Age of marriage #
In school at 9 652.643 .139 .000 .015 .127
(385.634) (.236) (.215) (.031) (.695)
Height (cm) 23.830 .016 .003 .003 .069
(22.897) (.015) (.011) (.002) (.041)
Age in years 337.045 .063 .018 .009 .626
(52.907)** (.071) (.053) (.009) (.182)**
Contraceptive
intervention 764.413 .604 .146 .004 .016
(274.842)** (.195)** (.155) (.024) (.484)
Value father’s land 26.840 .097 .012 .015 .188
(99.173) (.043)* (.045) (.007)* (.156)
Father business 1,459.563 .111 .116 .078 .689
(821.427) (.333) (.289) (.045) (.866)
Father farmer 349.843 .060 .178 .153 .554
(397.548) (.258) (.173) (.029)** (.633)
Father’s schooling 42.967 .158 .174 .003 .067
(46.388) (.028)** (.029)** (.004) (.083)
Mother’s schooling 8.590 .214 .078 .000 .129
(107.511) (.053)** (.057) (.007) (.147)
Hindu 4,969.459 .337 .486 .098 2.356
(734.311)** (.315) (.274) (.037)** (.859)**
Mom alive age 50 104.591 .594 .576 .000 .125
(506.990) (.295)* (.191)** (.035) (.767)
Dad alive age 50 660.828 .091 .037 .055 .725
(364.151) (.307) (.248) (.040) (.759)
Year of birth ﬁxed
effects Yes No No No No
Observations 1,846 1,125 1,559 1,852 1,852
Note.—Data are taken from the 1996 MHSS. IV estimates: instruments are age of menarche and age of menarche
interacted with in school at age 9. All regressions also include 5-year cohort dummies. Robust standard errors account
for clustering at the bari. Value of dowry is collected from the following survey question: “What was the total value of
dowry from your . . . marriage?” asked of each of the respondent’s marriages. Whether the value given reﬂects the
1996 value or the value at the time of marriage is ambiguous, particularly since two-thirds of dowries include in-kind
transfers such as jewelry, land, and animals, so age of birth ﬁxed effects are used to account for potential nominal
valuations.
a The number of observations reﬂects a high rate of nonresponse for the dependent variable.
b Asked of current spouses only, so col. 3 includes only women married to a ﬁrst spouse in 1996.
* Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
on the basis of the distribution of husbands’ observable characteristics,
we can assess whether the additional expenditure on later marriages is
sufﬁcient to buy their daughters positions in families of comparable
quality to those of younger brides.
These estimates are presented in table 6. Indeed, examination of the
MHSS data suggests that the increased schooling accompanying late
marriage comes at a substantial cost to the family. An IV estimate of the
dowry cost of later marriages, presented in column 1, indicates that the
wealth a girl brings into marriage increases by an average of 11 percent914 journal of political economy
with each additional year that marriage is postponed, although the point
estimate is signiﬁcant only at the 10 percent level. Meanwhile, columns
2–5 reveal no corresponding improvements in the characteristics of
spouses in terms of education level, age, or family background (father’s
education and wealth relative to bride’s father). This combination of
marriage market outcomes indicates that the average additional dowry
cost of late marriage is a good approximation of the decrease in female
marriage market value that accompanies age in rural Bangladesh. The
fact that late bloomers are no worse off in terms of observable spousal
quality also potentially suggests a preference among parents for allo-
cating marriage payments across daughters to equate their marital
outcomes.
VI. General Equilibrium Analysis
The previous empirical estimates address how a woman’s educational
choice changes if her individual constraint, age of menarche, changes.
This corresponds to asking how the chosen level of education changes
when varying an individual’s constraint within the same equilibrium of
the marriage market. Hence, it is not immediately obvious how this
estimate corresponds to the overall impact of imposing a universal con-
straint, which leads the market to a new equilibrium. In this section we
analyze the general equilibrium effects of such a regulation and use the
results to estimate the impact of enforcing different possible legal ages
of consent on female education.
A. Theoretical Considerations
Here we provide a discussion of how the demand for and supply of
brides of different age levels are affected by imposing a minimum mar-
riage age on the market. For a formal analysis, see the Appendix.
We think about the marriage market in Bangladesh as a large and
impersonal market, where the demand for and supply of brides and
grooms are equated through dowry payments (payments from the
bride’s family to the groom). These payments depend on both the
groom’s and the bride’s observable characteristics. The characteristic
we focus on is the bride’s age: we assume that there is a different market
dowry level for every possible bride age. It is well documented that men
in Bangladesh have a preference for younger wives, and dowry payments
are monotonically increasing in the bride’s age. This creates an incentive
for families to marry their daughters earlier since this decreases the
dowry payment they are required to pay. Nevertheless, women are het-
erogeneous in what age they decide to get married, partly because some
women have exogenous restrictions on marriage age (e.g., because theyfemale schooling attainment in bangladesh 915
reach puberty at an older age) and partly because some families decide
to delay marriage despite the increased cost (e.g., to let the daughter
ﬁnish secondary school). In equilibrium, subject to the constraint im-
posed on marriage age by the age of puberty, we expect women who
are more keen to marry early (or less keen to marry later) to enter the
marriage market at a young age, marry men who are more eager to
marry younger brides, and pay smaller levels of dowry. Similarly, we
expect women who are more eager to marry later to enter the marriage
market at an older age, marry men who are less eager to marry younger
brides, and pay higher levels of dowry.
Enforcing a minimal legal marriage age implies that women who ¯ t
in the absence of the regulation would have married younger than age
must decide whether they still want to marry and, if yes, then at what ¯ t
age satisfying the legal requirement. Similarly, men who in the absence
of regulation would have married a bride younger than have to decide ¯ t
whether they still want to marry and, if yes, then choose an optimal
bride age among those that are legally permitted. In general, both the
demand for and supply of brides older than increase as a consequence ¯ t
of the regulation. However, in the absence of any restriction on pref-
erences, there is no reason to expect a symmetric increase in the demand
for and supply of all marriage ages older than . Hence, the prices ¯ t
(dowry levels) that cleared the market in the absence of regulation
generally do not equilibrate the market after the regulation. To restore
equilibrium, dowry levels corresponding to bride ages above must ¯ t
change. These price changes in turn can change the marriage age de-
cisions of even those women who in the absence of regulation would
have married later than and can change the bride age choices of those ¯ t
men who in the absence of regulation would have chosen a bride older
than . Hence, marriage age decisions are effected even for those people ¯ t
who are not directly affected by the regulation.
To illustrate the previous point, consider an example in which there
are two types of women, and , and two types of men, and . ww mm 12 12
Assume that the number of women is equal to the number of men and
that half of the women and men belong to each of the types above.
There are three possible marriage ages of women: “very young,” “young,”
and “mature.” Both women and men have quasi-linear preferences in
money. Men of type are more eager to acquire younger brides, and m1
the utility they attain from marrying a very young, young, or mature
bride is 150, 100, and 50 monetary units, respectively. Men of type m 2
attach utility levels 30, 20, and 10 to marrying a very young, young, or
mature bride. In this example, assume that women reach puberty at a
very young age, and hence all women are free to choose among all
possible marriage ages. Women of type are indifferent between mar- w1
rying at a young and at a very young age, both giving them a utility of916 journal of political economy
20 monetary units; but they prefer to marry at a mature age, yielding
a utility of 50 monetary units. For women of type , getting married w2
at a very young age gives a utility of 20 monetary units, getting married
at a young age gives 40 monetary units, and getting married at a mature
age gives 60 monetary units.
In this example, it is easy to verify that in any market equilibrium
without regulation, women of type get married at a very young age w1
(marrying men of type ), whereas women of type get married at mw 12
a mature age (marrying men of type ), and they pay a dowry that is m 2
higher than what the other type of women pay by something between
30 and 40 monetary units (there is an indeterminacy in the market-
clearing price due to the ﬁnite number of types). At this dowry premium
level, women of type are willing to pay the higher dowry and wait w2
to marry until reaching a mature age, whereas women of type would w1
rather marry at a very young age and save on the dowry payment.
Suppose now that an age of consent law is imposed on the market,
banning marriage at a very young age. It can be shown that in any
market equilibrium, women of type (who in the absence of the w2
regulation would have married at a mature age) marry at a young age
(to men of type ), whereas women of type (who previously would mw 11
have married at a very young age) marry at a mature age (to men of
type ), and the market-clearing dowry premium for marrying at a m 2
mature age versus at a young age can be anything between 20 and 30
monetary units. Hence, the regulation imposed on the market switches
the marriage order of different types of women.
The main feature of the above example is that women of type w1
attain more utility from postponing marriage from a young age to a
mature age than women of type , whereas the relative order of utility w2
gains is exactly the opposite when postponing marriage from a very
young to a young age. In the Appendix we formally show that if the
relative order of incremental utilities from postponing marriage by a
year remains the same over different age levels for any two women, and
similarly the relative order of incremental utilities from marrying a bride
1 year younger remains the same over the whole range of possible bride
ages for any two men, then imposing a minimal legal marriage age does
not change the marrying order of different women and men.
27 In par-
ticular, if preferences satisfy this condition, then imposing a minimum
legal age of marriage x induces a very simple equilibrium adjustment:
women who in the absence of regulation would have married younger
marry exactly at the new minimum legal age, but the marriage timing
27 This restriction on preferences is similar to supermodularity assumptions often im-
posed in the matching and search literature (see, e.g., Shimer and Smith 2000; Legros
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decisions of all other women remain unchanged. Moreover, the relative
dowry premium for any additional year above x remains the same as
before; that is, relative equilibrium prices are not affected by the
regulation.
The meaning and validity of the above assumptions depend on the
reasons behind preferences over female marriage age. Consider ﬁrst
that the main motivation for preferring younger brides is to increase
fertility by expanding the reproductive interval.
28 Then the above re-
strictions are equivalent to assuming that (i) if for a man the incremental
utility of the kth child is higher than for another man, then the same
relationship holds between incremental utilities of the lth child as well,
for any k, ; and (ii) there is a similar stable ordering with respect l 1 0
to women’s incremental utilities/disutilities from having an additional
child. If degree of spousal control rather than fertility drives preferences
over bride’s age, then the restriction is equivalent to assuming that if
an increase in spousal control gives higher utility to one man relative
to another at some level of control, then the same relationship holds
at every level. Finally, if women’s age of marriage choices are mainly
driven by schooling, then the restriction implies that the order of women
concerning incremental utilities from additional years of schooling does
not depend on which school year is considered. One characteristic of
the setting that makes this assumption more appealing is that degree
completion is uncommon within the age period under study. Since
secondary school starts around age 12 and ends around age 18, the
additional years of schooling we examine are additional years of high
school for the majority of our sample.
The fact that the adjustment from one equilibrium to another is so
simple, provided that the above assumptions hold for preferences of
women and men, implies that our estimates of how a woman’s education
level depends on what age she reaches puberty can be used in a straight-
forward way to assess the impact of imposing various possible minimum
legal ages for marriage on aggregate female educational attainment.
B. The Effect of a Minimum Legal Age of Marriage on Women’s
Education
If equilibrium adjustment after imposing a minimum legal age of mar-
riage simply implies that women who would have married at a younger ¯ t
age marry at the new legal minimum age and that marriage time de-
cisions of all other women are unaffected, then the following results
28 While this isunlikely tobe truegiventhatfertilitylevelsarenowherenearthebiological
maximum and very early childbearing can actually decrease future fertility, anecdotal
evidence from many sources indicates that it is widely believed.918 journal of political economy
hold for how the educational attainments of different women are af-
fected by the legal change: (i) there is no effect on women who reach
puberty after age , and (ii) for a woman who reaches puberty before ¯ t
age , the introduction of a minimum legal marriage age has the same ¯ t
effect as postponing her menarche to age . The introduction of a ¯ t
minimum marriage age imposes exactly the same lower bound on a
woman’s marriage age as if menarche was delayed, and since dowry
premium levels above the minimum age do not change after a legal
minimum age is imposed, optimal choices adjust in the same manner.
Then if age of menarche is distributed among women independently
of their preferences, a reduced-form estimate of the inﬂuence of delay
in age of menarche on educational attainment can be used to provide
an estimate of the average change in female education that arises from
introducing distinct minimal legal ages of marriage. In particular, the
effect on average female education of introducing minimal marriage
age is ¯ t 1 tmin
¯ t1
DE p g(t)D , (3)  ¯ t,t t
tptmin
where g is the distribution function of menarche and is the average D ¯ t,t
effect of postponing the age of menarche from to on years of school- ¯ tt
ing. This result enables us to provide a structural estimate of the impact
of age of consent laws. In particular, the terms can be recovered Di,j
from an OLS regression of schooling attainment on age of menarche
in which each menarcheal age is entered separately as a binary variable
in the regression. Then (3) can be calculated for each possible t ! min
using information from the MHSS sample on the distribution of age ¯ t
of onset.
For the policy predictions we restrict the sample to women who were
enrolled in school at age 9, under the presumption that future cohorts
will have near-universal enrollment at early ages. According to these
estimates, presented in table 7, imposing a minimum marriage age of
13 would increase the average education of girls in Matlab by an average
of only 0.024 year, whereas a legal minimum of 15 would increase av-
erage schooling by 0.219 year, with the local supply of schools held
constant. The marginal effect of an age minimum is increasing through
age 16 and then falls thereafter.
To understand the determinants of this marginal effect, it is useful
to rewrite (3) as follows:
¯ t1 t1
DE p g(k)D . (4)  t,t1 t [] tptmin kptminfemale schooling attainment in bangladesh 919
TABLE 7
Predicted Effect of Age of Consent Laws on Average Female Education
in Matlab
Age
11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Betamenarche at t .477 .908 .978 1.251 1.873 1.674
(.68) (.58) (.59) (.57) (.61) (.67)
g(t) .006 .052 .231 .360 .203 .096 .051
Implied policy
effect of tmin
() DmE .003 .024 .044 .219 .745 .557
Note.—Data are taken from the 1996 MHSS. In the ﬁrst row of the table, beta refers to the coefﬁcient on an age-
speciﬁc dummy for menarcheal age from a regression of schooling attainment on menarche. In row 2, is the g(t)
distribution function of menarche at each age t. The implied policy effect is calculated according to eq. (3) in the text.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
This formula reveals that the aggregate effect of increasing the min-
imum age depends on two factors: the number of women for whom it
introduces a new constraint and the extent to which it affects the school-
ing choices of these women. As we saw in Section V, , the incre- Dt,t1
mental effect of an additional unmarried year for those who are affected
by this change (the “treated” in the IV estimate), is substantial until age
16 and then signiﬁcantly lower. However, this is partially offset by the
fact that the number of women affected by the change, , is
t1  g(k) kptmin
monotonically increasing. The higher the minimum legal age, the larger
the number of women who reach puberty by that age. In particular, a
substantial proportion of women reach puberty at age 16, increasing
the marginal effect of setting the minimum legal age to 17 as opposed
to 16.
Nevertheless, the marginal effect of increasing the legal age is de-
creasing after age 16. According to our estimates, minimum age laws
of 16 would generate similar schooling effects of minimum age laws of
17. This result has potentially important policy implications given the
current predominance of high minimum marriage ages that appear to
be too costly to enforce. A minimum marriage age of 16 would likely
be far easier to enforce than the current target of 18 and still achieve
most of the beneﬁts in terms of female education.
VII. Conclusions
This paper provides empirical evidence that the institution of adolescent
marriage in developing countries reduces female education. When in-
dividual girls in rural Bangladesh are forced by biology to delay mar-
riage, they attain signiﬁcantly more schooling and are more likely to be
literate. Under plausible assumptions about local marriage markets,920 journal of political economy
these results indicate a 5–8 percent improvement in average female
schooling from enforcing consent laws between ages 15 and 17.
The approach we introduce to estimate equilibrium adjustment ef-
fects from partial equilibrium results can potentially be used in other
competitive market settings to assess the impact of imposing lower
bounds on transactions. One could, for example, examine the effect of
imposing minimum quality standards for a given product of heteroge-
neous quality. Our methodology would identify conditions under which
exogenous individual-level variation in the marginal cost of product
quality can be used to assess the impact of a universal quality regulation.
Appendix
A. The Model
We consider a marriage market with a set of women and men W p {w ,… ,w } 1 nw
. The model is static in that all individuals enter the marriage M p {m ,… ,m } 1 nm
market at the same time; however, the same model can be derived from a
dynamic model in which different cohorts enter the market each year.
29 There-
fore, the static model can be viewed as a simpliﬁcation that provides a shortcut
for the analysis. In the model, women choose levels of schooling and age of
marriage, and men choose the age of their brides. Both men and women have
the option not to marry. For simplicity, men’s schooling decisions are assumed
to be independent of marriage market outcomes and therefore are excluded
from the analysis. Similarly, we assume that women do not care about the age
of their spouses and do not explicitly model men’s decisions concerning what
age to marry. Note that although we talk about decisions of women and men
in the marriage market, what we have in mind are the preferences and choices
of the relevant decision makers such as parents.
Women can marry at ages . Let denote the marriage t , t 1, …, tx min min max i
age decision of , and let denote the decision of on the age of w  Wy m  M ii i
his bride. For notational simplicity deﬁne (similarly ) to be in the xy t 1 ii max
case in which the individual decides not to marry. Women are constrained in
their marriage age decision by age of puberty: , where is the age when x ≥ pp ii i
reaches puberty. With respect to schooling choices, let denote the years w  We i i
of education above woman chooses. An important assumption in the tw min i
model is that women’s education levels are constrained by marriage. In partic-
ular, if woman decides to marry at age t,t h e n . we ≤ tt ii min
We assume that the market is competitive and that the market-clearing prices
are dowries women pay to grooms at marriage that depend only on bride’s age.
Let denote the amount of dowry a woman has to pay if she decides to marry d(t)
at age t. A woman who does not get married does not have to pay any dowry:
. Individuals’ preferences are assumed to be quasi-linear in the d(t 1) p 0 max
amount of dowry paid or received.
The utility of woman from marriage net of transfers is . Given that wu (x , e) ii i i
29 See an earlier version of our paper.female schooling attainment in bangladesh 921
we assume that dowry depends on but not on , we can simplify the utility xe ii
function of women by substituting in the optimal level of education compatible
with any given possible marriage time. Let for U(x) p max u(x, e) x  i 0≤e≤xti min
and (women who do not marry (t ,… ,t ) U(t 1) p max u(t 1, e) min max i max 0≤eimax
do not face any constraint on education). We assume that is concave but put Ui
no restriction on whether it is increasing or decreasing. The utility of man mi
from marriage net of transfers is .
30 We assume that is decreasing and V(y) V ii i
concave, which implies that dowries have to be increasing in bride’s age in order
to clear the market.
31
B. Competitive Equilibria with and without a Minimum Legal Age of Marriage
We deﬁne competitive equilibrium in the marriage market the standard way.
Deﬁnition. A competitive equilibrium of the marriage market consists of
a vector of dowries and marriage age decisions ˆˆ ˆˆ d(t ), … , d(t ) x ,… ,x , min max 1 nm
such that for all and the following conditions hold: ˆˆ ˆ y ,… ,yx ≥ pw  W 1 ni i i w
i. Given the vector of dowries, all men make an optimal choice and all women
make a constrained optimal choice given that they can marry only after
reaching puberty:
ˆˆ ˆˆ U(x)d(x) ≥ U(x )d(x) Gp ≤ x ≤ t 1a n dw  W ii i ii i max i
and
ˆˆ ˆˆ V(y)d(y) ≥ V(x)d(x) Gt ≤ x ≤ t 1a n dm  M. ii i i min max i
ii. The market clears for every possible marriage age:
ˆˆ #{w  W : x p x} p #{m  M : y p x} Gt ≤ x ≤ t . ii ii min max
We also consider markets in which there is a minimum legal marriage age
such that . In this case, dowries are speciﬁed only for marriage ¯¯ tt ! t ≤ t min max
ages . A competitive equilibrium of the constrained market is deﬁned ¯ t,… ,tmax
analogously to that of the unconstrained market case.
In general, it is difﬁcult to relate equilibrium marriage age choices in the
unconstrained market to a market with an age minimum. In what follows, we
impose the assumption that both women and men can be unambiguously or-
dered with respect to their incremental utilities from delaying marriage by 1
year. We also make an assumption that rules out nongeneric cases in which there
exist a woman and man for whom increasing the bride’s age at marriage by 1
year gives them exactly the opposite incremental utilities. The latter assumption
is needed to guarantee uniqueness of equilibrium, which facilitates the com-
parison of unrestricted and restricted markets.
Assumption 1. For any , ( ), it holds that if
  ww  Wi ( iU (x)U(x   ii i i
30 In particular, the utility of a man who decides not to get married is . V(t  1) i max
31 Note that the model assumesthat allwomen and menareofequalquality;inparticular,
any man is indifferent between marrying two brides of the same age. This assumption is
made to keep the model simple. Our conclusions would remain the same if parallel
marriage markets existed for different-quality women and men.922 journal of political economy
for some , then 1) ≥ U (x)U (x1) t ≤ x ≤ t    ii min max
         U(x )U(x 1) 1 U (x )U (x 1) Gt ≤ x ≤ t 1.    ii i i min max
Assumption 2. For any , ( ), it holds that if
  mm  Mi ( iV (x)V(x   ii i i
for some , then 1) ≥ V (x)V (x1) t ≤ x ≤ t    ii min max
         V(x )V(x 1) 1 V (x )V (x 1) Gt ≤ x ≤ t .    ii i i min max
Assumption 3. For every , it holds that there are no x  {t ,… ,t } min max
and such that . w  Wm  MU (x)U(x1) p [V(x)V(x1)] ij i i i i
Theorem 1. Assume that assumptions 1–3 hold. Then there exists a unique
vector of marriage time choices that can be part of a ˆˆ ˆˆ x ,… ,x , y ,… ,y 1 n 1 n mw
competitive equilibrium. Similarly, for every minimal legal marriage age ¯ t 
, there exists a unique vector of marriage choices
¯ t ˆ {t 1, …, t } x ,… , min max 1
that can be part of a competitive equilibrium of the corresponding
¯¯ ¯ tt t ˆˆ ˆ x , y ,… ,y n 1 n mw
constrained market.
Proof. Before proving the theorem, we establish the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1. Assume that assumptions 1 and 2 hold. If , ˆˆ ˆ d(t ) ,…,d(t ) x , min max 1
, is a competitive equilibrium, then for every x,
  ˆˆ ˆ …, xy ,… ,yx  {t , n 1 n min wm
such that , the following properties hold:
  ˆ …, t 1} x 1 x #{w  W : x p max ii
implies for all such that ;
     ˆˆ ˆ x } ( 0 U(x )U(x) ≤ d(x )d(x) w  Wx ≤ x ii i i
implies for all such
     ˆˆ ˆ #{m  M : y p x } ( 0 V(x)V(x ) ≥ d(x )d(x) m  M ii i i i
that ; implies for all
   ˆˆ ˆˆ y ≤ x #{w  W : x p x} ( 0 U(x )U(x) ≥ d(x )d(x) ii i i i
such that and ; and implies
   ˆˆ w  Wx ≥ xp ≤ x #{m  M : y p x} ( 0 V(x) ii i i i i
for all such that .
     ˆˆ ˆ V(x ) ≤ d(x )d(x) m  My ≥ x ii i
Proof. Suppose that the claim does not hold. Consider ﬁrst the case in which
there exists and x, such that , ,
    ˆ m  Mx  {t ,… ,t 1} y ≤ xx ! x i min max i
, and . If , then the pre-
   ˆˆ ˆˆ #{m  M : y p x} ( 0 V(x)V(x ) ! d(x )d(x) y p x jj i i i
vious inequality directly implies that cannot be an optimal choice for , a ˆ ym ii
contradiction. Suppose now that . Since , there exists ˆˆ y ! x #{m  M : y p x} ( 0 ij j
such that . Since and , it has to be that ˆˆ ˆ ˆ m  My p xy p xy ! xV (y)        ii i i i i
. Then assumption 1 implies that
  ˆ V (x) ≤ V(y)V(x) V (x)V (x ) ≤ V(x)      ii i i ii i
, which further implies that , contradicting that
     ˆˆ V(x ) V (x)V (x ) ! d(x )d(x)    ii i
is an optimal choice for . Consider next the case in which there exists ˆ y p xm    ii
and x, such that , ,
     ˆˆ m  Mx  {t ,… ,t 1} y ≥ xx ! x #{m  M : y p i min max ij j
, and . If , then the previous inequality
       ˆˆˆ x } ( 0 V(x)V(x ) 1 d(x )d(x) y p x ii i
directly implies that cannot be an optimal choice for , a contradiction. ˆ ym ii
Suppose now that . Since , there exists such
   ˆˆ y 1 x #{m  M : y p x } ( 0 m  M   ij j i
that . Since and , it has to be that
         ˆˆ ˆ ˆ y p xy p xy 1 xV (x )V (y) ≥ V(x )       ii i i i i i
. Then assumption 1 implies that , which fur-
   ˆ V(y) V (x)V (x ) ≥ V(x)V(x )    ii i i i i
ther implies that , contradicting that is an
     ˆˆ ˆ V (x)V (x ) 1 d(x )d(x) y p x      ii i
optimal choice for . This proves that the corresponding claims for women are
  i
analogous to the above, from assumption 1. QED
Lemma 2. Assume that assumptions 1 and 2 hold and that there is a min-
imum legal age of marriage . If , ˆˆ ¯¯ ˆ t  {t 1, …, t 1} d(t), … , d(t ) x , min max max 1
, is a competitive equilibrium, then for every x,
  ¯ ˆˆ ˆ …, xy ,… ,yx  {t,… , n 1 n wmfemale schooling attainment in bangladesh 923
such that and , the following assumptions
   ˆ t } x 1 x #{w  W : x p x } ( 0 max ii
hold:
   ˆˆ ˆ U(x)U(x ) ≤ d(x )d(x) Gw  W such that x ≤ x ii i i
and
   ˆˆ ˆ V(x )V(x) ≥ d(x )d(x) Gm  M such that y ≤ x. ii i i
Furthermore, for every x, such that and
   ˆ ¯ x  {x,… ,t } x 1 x #{j  W : x p max j
, the following assumptions hold: x} ( 0
       ˆˆ ˆ U(x)U(x ) ≥ d(x )d(x) Gw  W such that x ≥ x and m ≤ x ii i i i
and
       ˆˆ ˆ V(x )V(x) ≤ d(x )d(x) Gm  M such that y ≥ x and m ≤ x . ii i i i
Proof. Analogous to the proof of lemma 1.
Proof of theorem 1. Standardargumentsestablishtheexistenceofacompetitive
equilibrium. Suppose that the assumptions of the theorem hold, and let ˆ ¯ d(t),
, , and , , ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ¯ ˆˆ ˆˆ …, d(t ) x ,… ,xy ,… ,yd (t), … , d(t ) x ˆ ,… ,x ˆ y ˆ ,… ,y ˆ max 1 n 1 n max 1 n 1 n wm wm
be two competitive equilibria of the marriage market with minimum marriage
age , where refers to the unrestricted market. ¯¯ t  {t ,… ,t } t p t min max min
Reindex women and men such that and
   U(x)U(x ) 1 U (x)U (x )    ii i i
whenever and . Assumptions 1 and 2 im-
       V(x)V(x ) ! V (x)V (x ) i ! ix ! x    ii i i
ply that there is a reindexing like that. Then we claim that if , x ,… ,xy , 1 n 1 w
constitutes a competitive equilibrium with some dowry vector, then
  …, yi ! nm
implies , and and imply . To see this, note that
  iy ≤ yi ! ip ≤ xx ≤ xy 1 y        ii i i i i ii
for contradicts that both and are optimal choices under the same
  i ! ix x   ii
dowry vector. Similarly, and for contradict that both and
  x 1 xx ≥ pi ! ix      ii i i i
are optimal choices under the same dowry vector. xi
Suppose now that and . The above results then imply that ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ x p yx ˆ 1 y ˆ y ˆ ! p ij i j j i
and that there exists such that and . Then
  ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ i 1 ix 1 yx ˆ p y ˆ d(x )d(y) ≤      ij i j i j
. By lemma 1 this implies . Further- ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ U (y)U (x ) d(y)d(y ˆ) ≤ U (y)U (y ˆ)         ij ii j j ij ij
more, since is an optimal choice for given , ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ¯ ym d (x), … , d(t ) d(y) jj max j
. Combining the previous inequalities implies ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ d(y ˆ) ≥ V(y ˆ)V(y) V(y ˆ) jj jj j jj
. This can be compatible with only if ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ V(y) ≤ U (y)U (y ˆ) x ˆ p y ˆ V(y ˆ)      j j ij ij i j j j
. But this, together with concavity of and ,wouldimply ˆ ˆˆ V(y) p U (y)U (y ˆ) VU      j j ij ij j i
, contradicting assumption 3. Therefore, ˆˆ ˆ ˆ V(y ˆ)V(y ˆ 1) p U (y ˆ 1) U (y ˆ)    jj jj i j i j
implies . The same arguments establish that implies . ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ x p yx ˆ ≤ y ˆ x ˆ p y ˆ x ≤ y ij i j ij i j
Combining these establishes that . ˆˆ ˆˆ x p y ⇔ x ˆ p y ˆ ijij
Suppose now that for some . Without loss of generality, let ˆ ˆ y ( y ˆ m  M ii i
. Let be such that (the existence of such a woman is guar- ˆ ˆˆ ˆ y ! y ˆ w  Wx p x ii j j i
anteed by the market-clearing condition). The result in the previous paragraph
implies that . Since is optimal given , ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ¯ ˆˆ x ˆ p y ˆ yd (t), … , d(t ) V(y)V(y ˆ) ≥ ji i max ii ii
. Since is optimal given , ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ¯ ˆˆ d(y ˆ)d(y) y ˆ d(t), … , d(t ) V(y)V(y ˆ) ≤ d(y ˆ) ii i max ii ii i
. Since is optimal given , . Since ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ¯ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ d(y) xd (t), … , d(t ) U(y ˆ)U(y) ≤ d(y ˆ)d(y) ij max ji ji i i
is optimal given , . These four ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ¯ ˆˆ x ˆ d(t), … , d(t ) U(y ˆ)U(y) ≥ d(y ˆ)d(y) j max ji ji i i924 journal of political economy
inequalities can hold simultaneously only if
ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ V(y)V(y ˆ) p d(y ˆ)d(y) p d(y ˆ)d(y) p U(y ˆ)U(y). ii ii i i i i ji ji
Concavity of and then implies . There- ˆˆ ˆ ˆ VU V (y)V(y 1) p U(y 1) U(y) i j ii ii ji ji
fore, for all . Then the result obtained in the previous paragraph ˆ ˆ y p y ˆ m  M ii i
establishes the claim. QED
Now we establish the main theorem, namely, that the introduction of a min-
imum age changes equilibrium decisions of women and men in a simple manner
if the above assumptions hold. In particular, those individuals who would have
married earlier than the minimum legal age in the unconstrained market get
married exactly at the minimum legal age in the constrained market, whereas
the rest of the women and men get married at the same time that they would
have in the unconstrained market.
Theorem 2. Assume that assumptions 1–3 hold. Let the unique vector of
marriage choices in competitive equilibrium be . Then for ˆˆ ˆˆ x ,… ,x , y ,… ,y 1 n 1 n mw
any minimal binding age , the unique vector of marriage ¯ t  {t 1, …, t } min max
choices in competitive equilibrium of the constrained
¯¯ ¯¯ tt tt ˆˆ ˆˆ x ,… ,x , y ,… ,y 1 n 1 n mw
market with minimum legal age satisﬁes if and if for
¯¯ tt ¯¯ ¯ ¯ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ tx p tx ! tx p xx ≥ t ii i i i
all . Similarly, if and if for all .
¯¯ tt ¯¯ ¯ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ w  Wy p ty ! ty p yy ≥ tm  W ii i i i i i
Proof. For the claim is trivial. Let . Let ¯¯ t p tt  {t 1, …, t 1} max min max
be a vector of endowments that together with , ˆˆ ˆˆ d(t ), … , d(t ) x ,… ,x min max 1 nw
constitute a competitive equilibrium of the unrestricted market (as ˆˆ y ,… ,y 1 nm
noted in the proof of theorem 1, a competitive equilibrium always exists).
Let and let . Deﬁne to be the ¯¯ ˆˆ W* p {w  W : x ! t} M* p {m  M : y ! t} x* ii ii
minimal x such that and . Let ¯ ˆ x ≥ t #{m  W : y p x} ( 0 D(x) p ii
for all . Construct a new dowry vector ¯ min [U(x)U(x*)] x  {t,… ,x*1} m M* ii i
such that for all and for all
     ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ dd (x) p d(x) x ≥ x* d(x) p d(x*) D(x) x* 1 x 1
. We claim that , together with , as constructed in the
¯¯ ¯¯   tt tt ˆ ¯ ˆˆ ˆˆ tdx ,… ,xy ,… ,y 1 n 1 n wm
theorem, constitutes a competitive equilibrium of the marriage market with
minimum legal age of marriage . By construction , ˆ ¯¯ ˆ td (t) p 0# { m  W : y p ii
for all , and for all . Furthermore, ¯ ˆˆ x} p #{w  W : x p x} t ≤ x ≤ tx ≥ pw  W ii max ii i
note that for all x, . But then the
         ˆˆ ˆ ˆ d(x)d(x ) p d(x)d(x ) x  {x*, …, t } max
starting assumption that , , constitutes a ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ x ,… ,xy ,… ,yd (t ), … , d(t ) 1 n 1 n min max wm
competitive equilibrium of the unconstrained marriage market implies that if
for some , then is a better decision than any other choice
¯ t ˆˆ ˆ ¯ w  Wx≥ xx p x ii i i
from if the dowry vector is . By assumption 1 and the deﬁnition
  ˆ {x*, …, t } d max
of for , is a better decision than any x for which given
¯   t ˆ ¯¯ ˆ d(x) x* 1 x ≥ tx x * 1 x ≥ t i
dowry vector . This concludes that is an optimal decision for in
¯   t ˆ ˆ dx w  W/W* ii
the constrained market with minimum legal marriage age under dowry vector ¯ t
. It is completely analogous to show, using assumption 2, that is an optimal
¯   t ˆ ˆ dy i
decision for in the constrained market with minimumlegalmarriage m  M/M* i
age given dowry vector . Furthermore, lemma 2 implies that
  ˆ ¯ td U (x) i
for all and
   ˆˆ ˆ ˆ U(x*) ! d(x)d(x*) p d(x)d(x*) x  {x*1, …, t 1} w  i max i
and that for all
   ˆˆ ˆ ˆ W* V(x*) V(x) ≥ d(x)d(x*) p d(x)d(x*) x  {x*1, ii
and . By assumption 2 and the deﬁnition of for
  ˆ …, t 1} m  M* d (x) max i
, it is also true that . This con-
     ˆˆˆ ¯¯ ¯ x* 1 x ≥ tV (t)V(x*) ≥ d(x*) d(t) p d(x*) ii
cludes that is an optimal decision for in the constrained market with
¯ t ˆ xm  M* iifemale schooling attainment in bangladesh 925
minimum legal marriage age under dowry vector . Consider now any
  ˆ ¯ td m  j
. Deﬁne to be the maximal x such that and . ¯ ˆ W* x** x ! t #{w  W : x p x} ( 0 ii
By lemma 2, . Also by lemma 2, ˆˆ U(x*) U(x**) ≤ d(x**)d(x*) V(x**) jj i
for all . This implies ˆˆ V(x*) ≥ d(x**)d(x*) m  M* V(x**)V(x*) ≥ U(x*)  ii i i j
for all . The concavity of the utility functions and ¯ U(x**) m  M* x** ! t ≤ x* ji
then imply for all . Then by the construc- ¯¯ V(t)V(x*) ≥ U(x*) U(t) m  M* ii j j i
tion of , it holds that . Combining the above
     ˆˆ ˆ ¯¯ dU (x*) U(t) ≤ d (t)d(x*) jj
ﬁndings concludes that is an optimal decision for in the constrained
¯ t ˆ xw  W* jj
market with minimum legal marriage age given dowryvector .Thisestablishes
  ˆ ¯ td
that , , and constitute a competitive equilibrium of the
¯¯ ¯¯ tt tt   ˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ x ,… ,xy ,… ,yd 1 n 1 n wm
marriage market with minimum legal age of marriage . Then by theorem 1, ¯ t
marriage time choices in every competitive equilibrium of the constrained mar-
ket with minimum legal marriage age are , . QED
¯¯ ¯¯ tt tt ¯ ˆˆ ˆˆ tx ,… ,xy ,… ,y 1 n 1 n wm
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